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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0275
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1574
AFGHA/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000152

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019

TAGS: [KCRM](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [SNAR](#) [AF](#) [AS](#) [CA](#) [IR](#) [IT](#) [JA](#) [PK](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: UNODC AND COUNTERNARCOTICS IN THE AF-PAK POLICY

REF: A. STATE 31663
[1](#)B. STATE 29482
[1](#)C. UNVIE 117
[1](#)D. 08 UNVIE 371
[1](#)E. UNVIE 0030
[1](#)F. STATE 3515

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY SCHULTE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. This is action request. Please, see para 5.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Ambassador met UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa on April 2, and discussed with him the Administration's new Af-Pak strategy and deployed the points in Ref A, highlighting our new regional emphasis and our interest in incorporating non-traditional partners such as Iran in UNODC's regional programs. Costa suggested that his policy review for UNODC in the coming weeks would take into account the new USG policy, but also made a plea for the need to strengthen UNODC's capacity to do such work. He reported that Canada and Australia had expressed an interest in giving contributions to UNODC's programs in Iran. DCM and Counselor also met a number of UNODC staff in recent days to seek their reaction to the White Paper (Ref B), stressing its focus on working with Pakistan, and advocating particular issues such as border security in Baluchistan. UNODC Operations Division Director Francis Maertens told DCM that UNODC would have to re-think its regional strategy in the face of the new US policy, noting that his staff is preparing a strategy paper for Japan which has recently expressed an interest in Pakistan. Roberto Arbitrio, head of UNODC's Europe and Central/West Asia Office, and Miwa Kato, Programme Management Officer, advised Counselor that the Pakistan paper they are preparing for Japan will likely focus on strengthening criminal justice capacity. Arbitrio noted UNODC's operational work in strengthening border security under the Triangle Initiative, and named several possible deliverables for Baluchistan.

[1](#)3. (SBU) At an April 2 luncheon Italian Ambassador hosted in honor of Italy's Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Italy announced its commitment to support UNODC's regional programs. A number of participants at the luncheon expressed support for a regional approach, urged the inclusion of Iran in such an effort, and asked Italy not to duplicate existing regional initiatives, such as the Dubai Process on Afghanistan-Pakistan border security initiated by Canada. Ambassador reviewed Ref A points with the Italian Special Envoy who was to see Costalater in the day.

14. (SBU) Mission looks forward to advancing the counternarcotics portion of our Af-Pak policy in Vienna. We recommend urging the Friends of Afghanistan Group in Vienna (Ref E) to include Pakistan as a member. Mission also recommends that we provide funding for a D-1 position to head UNODC's Islamabad office. We may also partner with other donors to support several border security projects in Baluchistan under UNODC's Triangle Initiative. Given Canada's focus on Kandahar province, the U.S. could partner with Canada to support such a project on border crossing in Chaman-Weishi in Baluchistan, with Canada funding activities on the Afghan side (Chaman) and the U.S. and Japan the Pakistan side (Weishi). The U.S. could also partner with countries like Italy, Germany and UK to fund UNODC programs on Pakistan-Iran border security, such as that at the Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing, with the U.S. funding Taftan programs on the Pakistan side, and others funding Mirjaveh programs in Sistan-Baluchistan in Iran. It may even be possible for partners to work with UNODC on border security in Bahram Chah/Barah Chah, a village bisected by the Afghan-Pakistan border, which UNODC's Arbitrio claims is a military stronghold of the Taliban and a depot for both drugs and weapons.

15. (SBU) Action Requested: Mission seeks Washington guidance as to whether (i) Washington would be willing to fund the D-1 position in UNODC's Islamabad office, and (ii) Mission should actively engage Canada, Japan, Italy, and other donors in Vienna to form partnership to support border security

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programs in Baluchistan, within the framework of UNODC's Triangle Initiative. We will work with others to incorporate Pakistan in the Friends of Afghanistan. End Summary and Action Request.

Costa's Reaction: Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran

16. (SBU) Meeting on April 2, Ambassador reviewed the U.S. White Paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encouraged Costa to think "big" about the two countries, including incorporating non-traditional regional partners for tackling the drug problem there. Ambassador highlighted the new attention to alternative development and agricultural assistance, and encouraged UNODC to develop programs in precursor chemicals control and border security, especially in Baluchistan. Costa told Ambassador that during his tenure (since 2002), UNODC had established criteria for a number of policy "lines," such as the annual Afghanistan Opium Survey, the link between narcotics and insurgency and the Triangle Initiative. He is in the process of discussing with his Executive Committee criteria for the next policy line. Topics under consideration include how national, bilateral, or multilateral military interventions have damaged Afghanistan's opium economy. He expects to "solidify" such discussions in a few weeks, and have a final decision by August. He seemed to imply that such discussions would incorporate the elements from the U.S. White Paper.

17. (SBU) Welcoming the new attention to alternative development and agricultural assistance, Costa claimed that while he is not against "forced" eradication, it could only be effective if done in a "muscular way, as in Colombia." He noted UNODC has taken a regional approach in fighting Afghan drugs, evident in its Rainbow Strategy, the Triangle Initiative and the Paris Pact. He highlighted the success UNODC had last year in the interdiction of precursor chemicals. (Note: Under UNODC's TARCET initiative, part of the Rainbow Strategy, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran authorities seized a total of 19.5 tonnes of precursor chemicals in those three countries in 2008. In addition,

Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan seized 27.5 tonnes in substitute chemicals in 2008. End Note.) Costa stressed the excellent new relationship between UNODC and UNAMA in Kabul, noting that UNAMA chief Kai Eide is so pleased with UNODC's new chief representative in Kabul (Jean-Luc LeMahieu) that Eide may no longer wish to upgrade UNODC's Kabul office. (Note: Costa previously persuaded Eide to fund a D-2 chief position at UNODC's office in Kabul to act as counternarcotics advisor to Eide and ultimately to Karzai. End Note.)

18. (SBU) Costa commented on the recent loss of the American chief of UNODC's Islamabad office (Note: The senior American is former INL DAS Christy McCampbell who left at the end of March to become Director of the Senate Drug Caucus. End Note.). However, UNODC has selected a young and capable Canadian from its Bangkok office to replace her. (Note: Although the position has been downgraded from a D-1 to P-4 after McCampbell's departure, partly for budget reasons, we understand the next incumbent will still have title of "chief representative." End Note.) On April 3, Counselor received an inquiry from another UNODC contact about U.S. willingness to fund the D-1 position in Islamabad. (Note: INL/AF Director Tom Williams, in his mid-March visit to UNODC, urged UNODC not to downgrade that position, See Ref C. End Note.)

19. (SBU) In Costa's view, the UNODC's last representative in Tehran, Roberto Arbitrio, had been instrumental in getting Iran to re-establish its Drug Liaison Office and re-activate regular briefings for the mini-Dublin group. (Note: Arbitrio left Tehran recently to become head of UNODC's Europe and West/Central Asia Office in Vienna. End Note) Costa added that Canada and Australia had expressed willingness to give "significant" amounts of money to UNODC for Iran programs.

Canadian and Australian Money for Iran? Pakistan?

110. (C) Subsequent to the Costa meeting, Counselor learned from her Canadian counterpart that Canada was unlikely to

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fund UNODC programs in Iran. Nelson said Canada has an unresolved political problem with Iran over the beating death of Iranian-Canadian journalist Kazemi in an Iranian prison. According to Nelson, Canada believes her death had been ordered by a "very senior" official from the Iranian Ministry of Interior. Canada has been demanding, without success, the arrest and trial of those responsible for her death, and withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran. In addition, Canada has been tabling an annual human rights resolution in the General Assembly. Although Canada has been the largest donor to UNODC's Afghanistan programs, such funds are prescribed strictly for use in Afghanistan only. Nelson said that recently UNODC has approached his government for funding activities in Pakistan. (Note: Canada gave UNODC Cdn\$27 million in 2007-2009 for Afghanistan. Another tranche of Cdn\$25 million expected for 2009-2011 will be used mainly for Kandahar province, to improve its security before Canada withdraws its troops in 2011. End Note.) Canada was able to re-program small amounts of its 2007-2009 Afghanistan money to upgrade security for UNODC's Islamabad office, such as \$200,000 for an armored car. Furthermore, Canada is considering contributing to a \$2 million UNODC project to strengthen Pakistan border control activities, possibly including the Chaman-Weishi crossing point between those two countries. Canada may also be interested in controlling precursor chemicals in Pakistan, and in the development of an UNODC country program for Pakistan. However, Nelson stressed that such contributions would be relatively small.

111. (C) The Australian Mission's Simon Mamouny told Counselor that UNODC staff have also sought clarification of a possible Australian contribution to UNODC's activities in Iran. The UNODC interlocutor said that Costa had been

promised such funding by the Australian Foreign Minister at The Hague. Our Australian contact noted that the Foreign Ministry had announced, after The Hague, a \$2 million donation to the UN and a \$1 million to the International Red Cross, specifically for humanitarian assistance programs in Pakistan. Mamouny said Australia has no political problem with Iran on counternarcotics issues, and its Mission here has recommended such cooperation, notwithstanding the differences on nuclear issues between the two countries. Mamouny noted that Australia gave UNODC \$4 to \$5 million in voluntary contributions.

Italy Committed to Regional Approach, Others Too

¶12. (SBU) On April 2, in preparation for a G-8 meeting in Trieste in June on Afghanistan regional issues, the Italian Ambassador to the UN in Vienna hosted a lunch in honor of the Italian Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Guests at the lunch included ambassadors or other representatives of the G-8, Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Note: Italy plans to invite to the Trieste meeting Iran, China, India, Turkey and three Central Asian countries as well. End Note.) Italian Ambassador said his country is ready to commit funds for UNODC's regional programs. Many lunch participants urged Italy not to duplicate other regional initiatives. Canada cited the Dubai Process, a Canadian initiative on Afghanistan-Pakistan border security, which had recently mediated an action plan agreed to by the two sides, and to which Canada has invited G-8 participation. (Note: Canadian Foreign Minister Cannon announced this at the March 31 The Hague meeting. End Note.) Japan expressed support for a regional, comprehensive approach. The German Ambassador said his government wants to use the mini-Dublin Group to encourage support for UNODC's Triangle Initiative. The Pakistani Ambassador underlined support for the new U.S. approach as a way to tackle extremists in the border region while trying to work with the less radical insurgents. He stressed the need to include Iran in any regional counternarcotics efforts. The UK Ambassador cited "enormous obstacles" in his country's bilateral counternarcotics programs with Iran. He expressed hope that Trieste could signal the importance of such cooperation, and asked the participants to encourage UNODC to explore areas of cooperation with Iran. The Russian Ambassador praised the idea of "thinking big" and "thinking radically." He agreed with the need to break the link between narcotics and terrorism, and applauded the concrete ideas in the U.S. White Paper. He too stressed the need to involve Iran in any regional effort, as well as engaging other regional bodies

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such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The French rep, supporting the regional approach and priorities in the Italian paper, noted that engaging Iran should not be limited to counternarcotics, but should include other regional economic matters, such as energy and water. The Afghan representative thanked President Obama for the new U.S. strategy, which he said, was "better than expected" and "well-received" at home. He called for a monitoring system to ensure the effective use of international resources. Ambassador handed out copies of the White Paper and of Secretary Clinton's remarks in The Hague, and reviewed, with the Italian Special Envoy, the points he made to Costa in their meeting in the morning (see Para 6 above).

UNODC Rethinking the Regional Program

¶13. (SBU) In a meeting with DCM and Counselor on March 30, Francis Maertens, Director of UNODC's Division of Operations, responded that UNODC would have to re-think its regional program in the face of the new U.S. policy, which, he noted, had led to the appointments of new Special Representatives to

Afghanistan and Pakistan from Italy, France, and the UK. Maertens explained that UNODC's Islamabad office currently runs one law enforcement program funded by Germany. The rest of its programs are all focused on drug demand reduction. He mentioned that he had a team working on a concept paper on the justice sector in Pakistan, which will be sent to Japan for possible funding, because of Japan's recent expression of interest in Pakistan. The paper could possibly target a number of areas, such as building up law enforcement capacity in Baluchistan. He added that the next ministerial meeting of the Triangle Initiative, scheduled to take place in Islamabad in June, could also focus on a regional program aimed at law enforcement, precursor chemicals and criminal justice. However, Maertens highlighted the difficult political situation in Pakistan, the rift among its agencies, and the sustainability of the government in the face of such a rift. DCM noted that Pakistan has the "raw material" -- a government infrastructure, civil society and other institutions -- lacking in Afghanistan. The challenge, he said, is to bring all of them together to "lift" the country's civilian administration. Pointing out the potential growth in U.S. programs in Pakistan (Ref B), he also stressed the importance of not duplicating bilateral efforts. Maertens stated that UNODC would have to send a small mission to Pakistan to identify the needs that UNODC could fill. He also talked about UNODC's current negotiations with Canada on a "big package" that may include cross-border issues.

Japan's Growing Interest in Pakistan and the Region

¶14. (SBU) In meetings on 3/25 and 3/30, Miwa Kato, a former Japanese Foreign Ministry official, and currently a program management officer in the Division of Treaty Affairs at the UNODC, told Counselor that Japan has been expressing increasing interest in Pakistan, and in the region. Starting from a casual conversation she had with her former MOFA colleagues in Tokyo in January/February, she went on to brief them about UNODC's Triangle Initiative, which involves Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and which, in early March, conducted the first trilateral operation on their borders. The Japanese delegation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) during March 11-20 re-affirmed to UNODC their interest by pledging \$3 million to UNODC's Afghanistan programs. UNODC is in discussions with Japan on another \$2 million for UNODC's Iran programs. It is also negotiating for Japan to contribute a small sum (\$60,000-\$70,000) for a terrorism prevention project in Pakistan. Kato told Counselor that Japan had appointed its ambassador to Spain, Yoshikawa, to be Japan's special envoy to Afghanistan-Pakistan.

¶15. (SBU) Early in the week of March 23, Japan indicated to UNODC that it might consider donations for UNODC programs in Pakistan. In Kato's opinion, such contributions could amount to several million dollars. The amount is significant because, Kato said, Japanese contributions to UNODC have accounted for less than 1 percent of total voluntary contributions UNODC receives, compared to 10 percent or more from the U.S. As a result, UNODC is developing a Pakistan paper for Japan's consideration. Initially aiming at a

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Friends of Pakistan donors meeting Japan will co-host with the World Bank in Tokyo on April 17, Kato and her colleague Roberto Arbitrio, head of the Europe and West/Central Asia Unit, have since learned that the April 17 meeting would not be appropriate for both timing and substance reasons, since the meeting will focus on poverty alleviation in Pakistan. .

¶16. (SBU) Instead, Kato, working with Arbitrio, plans to complete "a solid proposal" by the end of April, which Costa can take to Tokyo in May, and then to the next Friends of Pakistan meeting. (Note: This Friends Group was formed in New York in September 2008, and held a subsequent meeting in Abu Dhabi in November 2008, attended by political

director-level representatives from the U.S., UK, UAE, and Pakistan. While those four countries formed the core of the Group, other participants at the April 17 meeting in Tokyo will include the G-7, plus Australia, Turkey, and the European Commission. End Note.) On April 7 Kato told Counselor that she and Bernard Frahi, Deputy Director of UNODC's Operations Division, would attend the April 17 meeting in Tokyo.

¶17. (SBU) Given Japan's interest in the "softer" side of security, Kato plans to concentrate on "durable" security institution-building, such as training and equipment to improve capacity and ways to improve mutual legal assistance. Based on her discussions with Japan, Kato has suggested focusing the paper in three areas: criminal justice reform, general border security, and regional cooperation. Tokyo responded with a request for an even narrower focus. In response to Counselor's question about border security in Baluchistan, Kato and Arbitrio said there had also been much discussion on how to target Baluchistan, as the expected military surge in southern Afghanistan would push traffickers and insurgents into Baluchistan, thereby making border security in Baluchistan for the region an increasingly important issue. However, Kato claimed that even the UN "cannot go there."

What Can Be Done in Baluchistan

¶18. (SBU) In subsequent conversations on April 1 and 7, Arbitrio, who spent four-and-a-half years in Tehran (until December 2008) as UNODC's representative in that country, gave a more upbeat vision of what UNODC could do in that region that straddles three countries. Although the UN, for security reasons, does not allow international staff to be posted in Baluchistan, Arbitrio believes that UNODC could post national staff there. In his view, UNODC could build on the Triangle Initiative to strengthen border security in that area. UNODC can identify national shortcomings, e.g., communications and intelligence capacity. Addressing such shortcomings would require improved software and hardware, such as establishing mobile units equipped with motorbikes, land cruisers, tracking and scanning devices. Improving intelligence capacity would require strategic planning and working with national police, something that has already been started with the Joint Planning Cell established in Tehran under the Triangle Initiative last year. (Note. The Cell planned and conducted a joint operation on the borders on March 8. End Note.) In response to Counselor's question, Arbitrio expressed his belief that deliverables for Baluchistan could include the establishment of border liaison offices, intelligence sharing through the Joint Planning Cell in Tehran, and a joint operation in the village of Bahram Chah/Bahrah Chah which is bisected by the Afghan-Pakistan border. He described the village as heavily "militarized" by the Taliban, and as a major depot for both drugs and weapons. He considered it too difficult to actually work there but expressed his belief that some work could be done "around" the village to fight drug trafficking.

Comment and Recommendations

¶19. (SBU) Mission believes that there is are a number of steps that we can take in Vienna to advance the counternarcotics portion of our new Af-Pak policy. The first is to invite Pakistan to the informal Vienna Friends of Afghanistan Group (started here last fall). At the last Friends meeting in January, Mission received Washington

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guidance (Ref F) to support the French chair's request to invite, with Afghanistan's concurrence, Russia, Poland to the meeting. (Note: France also invited China, but it did not

attend. End Note.) The U.K. will host the next Friends meeting on April 28. Mission can propose to the UK to invite Pakistan to the meeting, provided Afghanistan agrees.

¶20. (SBU) Mission also believes that given UNODC's current financial crisis, which has compelled restructuring measures at the UNODC, including downgrading the position of its representative in Pakistan from D-1 to P-4, Washington should consider contributions to UNODC to permit maintaining that Islamabad position at the D-1 level.

¶21. (SBU) In addition, Mission recommends, as an effective way to utilize international resources, partnering with other donors to support several border security initiatives in Baluchistan, within the framework of UNODC's Triangle Initiative. Given Canada's focus on Kandahar province, the U.S. could partner with Canada to support such a project on border security in Chaman-Weishi in Baluchistan, with Canada funding activities on the Afghan side (Chaman) and the U.S. and Japan the Pakistan side (Weishi). The U.S. could also partner with countries like Italy, Germany and UK to fund UNODC programs on Pakistan-Iran border security, such as that at the Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing, with the U.S. funding the Pakistan side (Taftan), and others funding the Iran side (Mirjaveh in Sistan-Baluchistan). It may even be possible for partners to work with UNODC on border security around Bahram Chah/Barah Chah, a village bisected by the Afghan-Pakistan border in Baluchistan, known as a military stronghold of the Taliban, and a depot for both drugs and weapons. End Comment and Recommendations.

SCHULTE